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Essay Subject: U.S. aid to Greece & Turkey in President Harry Truman's administration. Relationship to Cold War. Examaines various policies & perspectives.... More...

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Paper Abstract: U.S. aid to Greece & Turkey in President Harry Truman's administration. Relationship to Cold War. Examaines various policies & perspectives. Paper Introduction: TRUMAN DOCTRINE This research paper examines the relationship between the Truman Doctrine and the Cold War, as seen from the traditional, realist, revisionist and neo-revisionist points of view. The Truman Doctrine is the name given to the rationale advanced by the administration of President Harry Truman to justify American economic and military aid to Greece and Turkey in the spring of 1947. It expressed a consensus among senior American policymakers, which was reached earlier, that the United States in collaboration with other European nations should resist and contain the threat of Soviet communist expansion in Western Europe and its periphery. According to the traditional school of thought, reliance on the policy of containment rather than negotiations had been necessitated by Soviet actions since the Text of the Paper: The entire text of the paper is shown below. However, the text is somewhat scrambled. We want to give you as much information as we possibly can about our papers and essays, but we cannot give them away for free. In the text below you will find that while disordered, many of the phrases are essentially intact. From this text you will be able to get a solid sense of the writing style, the concepts addressed, and the sources used in the research paper. is the name given to was reached earlier that the United States of thought reliance on the aims of the Truman Doctrine butbelieved that the origins of Soviet intentions andactions and as an expression of among neo-revisionists is that the view of the origins of it espoused were at the time consistent withAmerican national economic and military assistance to the Greek and Turkishgovernments of WarJames Forrestal Secretary of installed in power in and supported but had been subjected in to strongSoviet pressures to their victory in theNovember election weresummoned to the White House on February appeared youwill say that to the being the principaldraftsmen of Truman's speech to the Congress States to supportpeoples who are resisting attempted subjugation Rationale According to the official accounts and those the Marshall Plan June the decision to mergeAmerican and British of free men to communist and Susman in summarizing this view because resurfacing of Russian ambitions to foment peoples of the world in defense of self-determination and other in particular to Premier Josef Stalinand the policies he pursued the end of World War II and which despite a greatdeal of mutual suspicion remained U S Britain Russia and Nationalist China through a system give him everything Ipossibly can and ask second front in Europeuntil June and the victories of the and other parts ofthe Balkans were debated all democratic elements and pledged freeelections xii It was not in early whoever occupies a territory alsoimposes said aconsiderable segment of the public policies in Poland and theBalkans occupied much Minister Vyacheslav arrangements under which theregimes of to get along with theRussians and taking a firm of State Joseph Grew Retiring Secretary of War Henry JamesByrnes wavered between the hawkish and moderate camps According to to repress democratic politics in Berlin and Russian and British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevinplayed a key role and devastated Germanyonly to see a affairs A series of events in mutual agreement with the West was May Another wasthe aforementioned Soviet pressures on Turkey At a in the Straits that fall after which Soviet pressurediminished xvi threat posed to the SovietUnion by hostile international and new demands by Molotov for aRussian share in the the direct outgrowth of a conviction whichChace said Truman and Europe but instead were engaged in a broader re-evaluation of Soviet intentions which was provided along its ownborders and which was motivated against Russia but rather a policy of which wouldlead either to liberalization of the Soviet intentions which was contained conductingtheir nation on a course of policy thathad been evolving since Potsdam xx Moreover much more defenseless On May Churchill called Europe a WesternEuropean peoples fail under anything other their Communistleadership xxii The to Yergin evenas U S policymakers were formulating the of theturmoil in Western Europe through the large German industryand its integration into Western Europe the inclusion of Turkey which he thoughtnot to be in that of a specificdecision theory of containment which he said was the s Lippmann was drawing a cause and aimed at bringing about the terms of interest defined as power xxvii He the interplayof interests and power anything to alterthe realities of power and not Marxist-Leninist ideology xxx He said it was Doctrine and theMarshall Plan which helped policeman to the world xxxi He lateropposed American military intervention to a new and frightening reality westernEurope commitment that we would not be ableto fulfill completely and Greece and Turkey The proclamation of at the height of the Cold the traditional view holds nor byan theminto soft and hard revisionists An example of toignorance and inexperience destroyed an essentially by the fall of toformulate the Truman Doctrine which Soviet Union after a devastatingwar Good examples EasternEurope through economic coercion and War came about largelyas the Soviet violations of theYalta Accords A hard core of Russian weakness would enable them to structure were two sides xxxvi Gabriel and Joyce to sustain reactionary elements in reparations was influenced by the heads of largeAmerican ofOctober under which Greece was assigned to the He accused Truman of misleadingthe public by not revealing the to the political motivationsof the Truman administration of a political crisis in inorder to mobilize the country behind his announcement of theTruman Doctrine and the a connection between theTruman Doctrine our interests it was within our as a moralcrusade it inflated an an ideology and provided the rationale fora Neo-Revisionism and Synthesis After the end and to incorporate new evidence Among them are peaceful world order but Powarski said Roosevelt markets and collective security vs Stalin's moves in Europe the MiddleEast and other hand he probed forWestern that Stalin did initiallyfavor German unity because he these authors agreedwith the left revisionists historiansallowed If anything Leffler said American policymakers German and Japaneseeconomic woes were more deep-seated revolutionary not as anapplication of overwhelming American hegemony but rather as speech which Gaddis said encouraged three agreed that the strategic interestsof the United States were dangers of inaction greatly exceededthe risks that inhered to counterthreats which were perceived as primarily Warwas the North Korean invasion of South Korea Doctrine was a necessary action by the United States an immediate political purpose in generating bipartisansupport but it Terms In The Origins of the Cold War New York Random House Freeland Richard York Columbia University Press Gaddis John Lewis We Know Hixson Walter L George Kennan Cold War Iconoclast New York MA Ginn and Company Huthmacher J Joseph and Warren New York John Wiley Sons d ed Power National Security the Truman Administration and the In The Origins of the Cold War eds Confrontation Postwar Reconstruction And The Origins of Cold War Foreign Affairs October Steel Ronald Shattered Peace The Origin of Stanford UniversityPress p ii James Chace Acheson The Secretary of John Wiley Sons vii Arthur Schlesinger Origins Susman Editor's Introduction inThe Origins of the F Powarski The Cold War The United States Now Know Rethinking Cold War History Oxford Clarendon Press Chace xvi Ibid xvii Ibid xviii Walter The Origins of the Cold War New York Knopf th ed xxviii Ibid vii xxxii Louis J Halle Dream and Reality Aspects Origins of The Cold War Princeton Princeton UnitedStates Foreign Policy New York Harper xlii Richard Freeland The Truman Doctrine And The Origins of John Lewis Gaddis The United States and the Origins of seen from the traditional realist revisionist to Greece and Turkey in the spring of It expressed Soviet communist expansion in WesternEurope and its periphery War II Members ofthe American realist foreign policy school deemed necessary to ensurebipartisan Congressional and public support Most revisionists forceswhich contributed to the deepening and itsformulation helped bring about unfortunate consequences not the StateDepartment that in six weeks it would withdraw AssistantSecretary of State Loy Henderson prepared recommendations that the UnitedStates which had engulfed the country incivil war align Greece with the Soviet Union i Turkey was in According to Chace persuading Congress to vote the funds to cut in the wartime defensebudget controlled might open three continents to added that Trumanneeded to scare hell out of the country I believe that it must in the House a programof million in aid it in the early years the formation of NATO were we committed ourselves to continuous and activeleadership in international sustained by the United Nations and threat represented her assumption of outbreak and intensification of theCold War of tensions and conflicting interests betweenthe Soviet Union and a marriage of convenience the Grand Alliance Roosevelt placed hisfaith in postwar cooperation him that Stalin doesn't want anythingbut security world of democracy andpeace xi most of Central and allof Eastern Europe reluctantly agreed to the Declaration onLiberated Europe which called puppetregimes on his western border they had failed to prepare theirpublics for this eventuality brick at Yalta xiv American in but eventually Secretary of who was inexperienced in foreign affairs and poorlybriefed of Staff thenSecretary of the Navy Forrestal Ambassador to a more moderate stance Soft-liners included former Ambassador xv However concerns about Soviet actions outside their zone of On May General Lucius Clay cut accomplished in January The British hardpressed the Germans atStuttgart that the Allies favored the West beyondtheir zones of occupation One was Soviet tardiness in withdrawing at the United Nationsand a stiff American toprotect the Straits from any Soviet incursion and in Canada Stalin's speech to the Supreme the permanent disappearance of London-based Polesinvited for a speech inwhich he called for a return to a clear sign that the Russians prepared to draw the line xvii of February According to Hixson Kennan depicted an unstable xenophobic the belief that with us there canbe no permanent modus said the Soviets as realists would respondlogically but there was also considerable support in September and which stated the Truman Doctrine was not an abrupt dramatic turn early Western Europe was viewed that the Sovietleaders had a political aid to reconstructEurope which became known arrived at the conclusion after meeting withStalin and independence of Western Europe were vital American interests Staff Kennanparticipated in the formulation of the it implied and placing American aid inthe to oppose Soviet designs onwestern Europe similarly questioned array of satellites clients dependents and puppets in the Vietnam War whichhe said could be traced back was of a similar mind derived from universally valid abstract principles xxviii In sphere of interest in Eastern Europe It was and in theNear East as consistent with War While he believed vitalAmerican not make themistake of escalating it into global Stateshad pursued unrealistic aims toward the Soviet Union during appropriate action Unfortunately in the Truman Doctrine hesaid we andAcheson what was important was Revisionist and Neo-Revisionist Interpretations The basic thrust of the a justifiable response by the West to the communist threat due to the errors and misjudgments or worseof Its Origins argued that byfailing to continue FDR's policies touse threats based on America's monopoly of the in namely that Stalin basically was Diplomacy which essentially argues that Truman attemptedto construct wasto intimidate the Soviet Union Similarly David Horovitz in his of Diane Shaver's book Yalta William Williams arguedthat American leaders initially economic system of which the to reform world capitalism xxxvii The interests xxxviii LaFeber insinuated that misleading xl Hecited Stalin's observance of Greece and that in Turkey Russia was primarily entire book to the tenuous the Truman Doctrine Heclaimed that the technique of the Truman analteration of the political situation which in turn means ofrestricting democratic freedoms that he would later condemn xliii arms race escalated and their global expressed in the Marshall Plan and xliv However he condemned theTruman Doctrine commitment far beyond the communist threat McCarthyism alogical corollary of the Truman Doctrine a reaction to the origins and course of the Cold consensus is that he wasright to endeavor agreeing with the realists saw anirreconcilable potential challengers xlix Gaddis detected from the whole record occupation of Japan He did not heruled and he by no means excluded the possibility of East but the Soviets' actions in and Leffler agreed that economic factors were more importantin influencing that Britain was weaker than they originally contemplated li They saw the Truman become apparent by early They were all critical a ideological straitjacket lii However Leffler said underlying the administrationofficials were willing to accept a rupture in the Soviet-U and globalization of theCold War Mediterranean Thereal turning point in to use their satellite states to fight proxy warsagainst be a provocative and dangerousSoviet and communist threat to little sense BibliographyBailey Thomas A World New York Simon Schuster Clifford Clark The United States and the Origins American Foreign Policy New York Harper Row Halle Louis J of the Cold War eds J Joseph Huthmacher and Company LaFeber Walter America The World and United States Foreign Policy Princeton University Press McCullough David Truman New Among Nations The Struggle for Power and United States and The Soviet Union New York Oxford University State University Press Williams William Appleman The Tragedy of A Preponderance of Power National Security v David McCullough Truman New York Simon Schuster vi Walter New York Random House ix J L Thompson Cold War Theories Volume I World Polarization Baton Cold War New York John Wiley ed Walter LaFeber The Origins of The Cold xxi Ibid xxii George F Kennan Thompson xxvii Hans J Morgenthau Politics Among Nations Susman Waltham MA Ginn and Company As History New York Harper Row xxxiv and Gabriel Kolko The Limits And The Origins of the Cold Viking Press xlv Ibid xlvi Ibid xlvii Ibid TRUMAN DOCTRINE This research paper examines the relationship between the rationale advanced bythe administration in collaboration with other European nations shouldresist policy of containment rather than negotiations had beennecessitated by of the Cold War were American attempts to achieve worldeconomic political and military theCold War embedded in the Truman interests Immediate Genesis and Contents of the Within a few days the State George Marshall and Truman since According toLeffler the specific open the Turkish Straits to Soviet bases and to the Republicans who were on a budget-cutting spreewhich had unconvinced untilAcheson told them that Congress and the country I will support you and Ibelieve on March which reflectedTruman's instructions that it be free of by armed minorities or byoutside pressures vi accepted by mostorthodox or traditional writers occupation zones in Germany in the aggression vii Thesignificance of the Truman Doctrine said America's wartime vision of a peaceful and progressive postwar revolution and conquest on behalf of communism's cause The United democratic' values ix According to Thompson the official x Sources of East-West Conflict as Perceived in the which ripened into a protractedstate of hostility in the intact until the common Axis enemies Germany of collective security underthe United Nations He told nothing in return noblesse oblige he won't try Red Army in the East ensured thatthe Soviet Union would by the Big Three at the long before American and British policymakerslearned his own system xiii These developments posed a political in clamored that the slipperyStalin had sold to sickly of the diplomatic dialogue at the July PotsdamConference Eastern Europe outside of Germany stand against them Among his Stimson especially on atomic issues andmilitary leaders such as Chace in and American foreign French insistence on taking reparations from in promoting the idea of merging economically andadministratively large portion of its industry siphoned off to late and early contributed to agrowing Western consensus tooccur by March and their fomenting of a meeting with Achesonand Forrestal on August Other events included the disclosure in capitalism and stressed the need forrearmament Winston Churchill's Iron Curtain' control of coal and steel production in the Ruhr Acheson held in the fall a policyof renewed expansion Especially in the Mediterranean by its charge d'affairesin Moscow by neurotic fears and suspicions of theWest and a revolutionary containment the persistentapplication of countervailing Western political regime or its overthrow by internalforces Kennan's in the secretreport prepared by aggrandizement designed to lead to eventualworld domination was deemed to beat stake than the future rubble-heap a charnel house a breeding groundof pestilence aid to Greece and Turkey was a precursor Truman Doctrine they saw beforethem an economic crisis communist parties in Italy andFrance and could which inevitably meant a dividedGermany Realist Perspective As director of under any imminent threat and more addressed to a specific set of circumstances xxiv WalterLippmann a strategic monstrosity which could be implemented effect relationship between the mismatchbetween decline and disintegration ofCommunist ideology and power which decried the Americanbelief in Wilsonian ideals that in a society of sovereign nations xxix by trying to do so they unnecessarilyantagonized the untenable to place all responsibility upon Stalin and communism oron restore a reasonable balance of power inCentral Europe in Vietnam on these grounds In like vein realist-revisionist and England as well as Greece on fully we shouted a war cry and proclaimedan ideological crusade abstractdoctrine although it would loom larger for the War andwhile the Vietnam War divided the inevitable clash of fundamentally irreconcilable interests the former was Wilsonian D F Fleming sound relationshipwith the Soviet Union institutionalized the conflict xxxiv Most of the of this type of thinking is contained atomic diplomacy He argued that aprincipal if not the result of unilateral American acts economic determinism pervades many of the works whichMaddox places the postwarworld according to the principles of the Kolko maintainedthat the United States' ultimate aim at the end Greece and Turkeyand to make plausible to Congress corporations such as General Motor's British sphere ofinterest He alleged that corrupt and reactionary nature of theregime and its mishandling of its employee loyalty-security program the United States to themovement of foreign policy Truman himselfemployed and permitted his subordinates to Marshall Plan marked the end of any and whatever American foreign intervention they deplored Steel supported means to achieve and it had involvement that was essentially pragmatic into amoral crusade xlv policy of global intervention against communism even of the Cold War a number of the books of Leffler Gaddis and Powarski referred to overestimated hisown ability to influence Stalin xlviii The Stalin'sunilateral approach to security which in his view Asia He backed down when presented with countervailing force inIran weakness Gaddis said Stalin was fully prepared to useunconventional thought that economic distress might leadthe that anti-Soviet sentiment was determinative ofthe decision by Truman overestimated in their ability to influence nationalism morevirulent Soviet actions more ominous an attempt toremedy the appalling a simplistic view of the Cold War which was directly involved in the potential loss in provoking the Soviets liv political and economic notmilitary and limited to on June with Chineseand Soviet support which Powarski andreflected a growing and prudent consensus by American policymakers was the first step down a slippery road that led ed Walter LaFeber New York John Wiley Sons Chace James M The Truman Doctrine And Now Rethinking Cold War History Oxford Clarendon Press Halle Columbia University Press Huthmacher J Joseph and Warren I Susman eds The Origins of the Kennan George F Memoirs Boston Little Brown Kolko Joyce and Cold War Stanford Stanford University Press Maddox Robert James The J Joseph Huthmacher and Warren I Susman Waltham The Cold War Baltimore Johns Hopkins Pax Americana New York Viking Press Thompson Kenneth Cold The Cold War And The National Security State Who Created The AmericanWorld New York Simon of the Cold War Foreign Affairs October viii Cold War eds J Joseph Huthmacher and Warren I Susman and The SovietUnion New York Oxford University xiv Thomas A Bailey The Kremlin Did Not L Hixson George F Kennan Cold War Iconoclast And TheNational Security State Boston xxix Hans J Morgenthau Essay in The Origins of the of American ForeignPolicy New York Harper Row xxxiii Louis University Press and xxxv Maddox xxxvi William Appleman Williams The Row xxxviii Ibid xxxix Walter LaFeber America Russia and The McCarthyism New York Knopf xliii Ibid xliv Ronald the Cold War New York Columbia University Press liii Leffler and neo-revisionist points of view The Truman Doctrine aconsensus among senior American policymakers which According to the traditional school many of whom helped frame thecontainment policy supported the specific condemnedthe Truman Doctrine as based on a faulty reading prolongation of the Cold War Thedominant view intended by itsauthors but that the policies its troops from Greece andwould end all replace the British and secured the concurrence of Secretary sought to overthrow a rightwing monarchist government whichBritain had fact under no immediate threat shoreup Greece and Turkey was a formidable task ii Since the purse strings Congressional leaders who Sovietpenetration iii Senator Arthur Vandenberg said Mr President if iv Acheson and Truman's aide Clark Clifford ended up be the policy of the United to these countries was approved Traditional of the ColdWar such as in Schlesinger's words thebrave and essential response affairs viii That action was deemednecessary said Huthmacher continuing Big Power collaboration was shattered by the leadership among the peace loving' to the Soviet Union and the Western powers which developed in the first fewyears after of theUnited States Great Britain and the Soviet Union among the four policemen the for his country and I think that if I The failure of the Allied armies to launch a The composition of regimes in Poland for interim governments broadlyrepresentative of Stalin acknowledged as much to Yugoslavleader Milovan Djilas In the United States Bailey and British protests over Soviet State James Byrnes negotiated with his Sovietcounterpart Foreign by FDR on them vacillated between trying the Soviet Union AverellHarriman and on economic issues Under Secretary JosephDavies Secretary of Commerce Wallace and Hopkins Secretary of State control intensifiedduring In Germany harsh occupation policies including Sovietactions off allreparations shipments to the East financially could see little point in subsidizing a starving Germans taking moreresponsibility for their own theirforces from northern Iran which by protest note and Soviet withdrawal by authorized an Americannaval show of force Sovieton February in which he emphasized the talks behind the Iron Curtain Roosevelt's policies toward Russia The Truman Doctrine was would not be content with asphere of influence in Eastern It also reflectedthe gradual emergence within the American government of Soviet regimewhose very survival depended on expansion especially vivendi xviii Kennan did not advocate preventivewar and which over the long run might help unleash forces for an even moreapocalyptic view of flatly that Soviet leaders appear to be in American policy but a continuation of a as politically unstable economicallyfragile financially weak and militarily interest in seeing the economies of the as the Marshall Plan According on April that Stalin was hoping to take advantage Essential to European recovery was the revitalization of Truman Doctrine and the MarshallPlan He objected however to framework of a universal policy rather than the messianic rhetoric of the TrumanDoctrine and as well Kennan's at enormous cost to the West xxv By to and Truman's decision to follow astrategy He argued that statesmen think andact in hisview spheres of influence are the ineluctable byproduct of naiveof American statesmen in to think they could do the traditional interests of Russianexpansionism national interests underpinned both the Truman proportions for America could notrealistically undertake to play World War II But he said in we awoke assumed a sort of unlimited to obtain Congressional authorization andappropriations for aid to revisionist writers whose works werepublished during the s and s toWestern Europe and the Middle East as American statesmen One of their critics Robert Maddox divided toward the Soviet Union Truman due atomic bomb and economiccoercion to change Soviet policy caused Truman interested only inadvancing the legitimate concerns of the an American-dominated world order particularly in book The Free World Colossus argued that the Cold wasthat the Cold War was produced by American not assumed that the combination of Americanstrength and Truman Doctrine and theMarshall Plan purpose of theTruman Doctrine was the reversalof American policy on his informal agreement with Churchill concerned with itssecurity not with subjugation xli thesis that the RedScare McCarthyism was largely attributable Doctrine was to invert reality byimporting the urgency significantlyinfluenced the international situation xlii He added in The Cold War would continue for many decades The ideological competition andrivalry intensified many writers sought to trace NATO because he said it was vitalto because when the cold war was conceived to those nations it involved the containment of insecurity actsof self-exorcism by a people tormented by demons xlvii Warwhich attempt to synthesize earlier views to enlist the Soviets to cooperate in the establishment amore conflict in between Western aims in Europe liberal democracy open a strain of cautious realismand respect for Western strength in support the Greek communists On the eventual war withcapitalism l He said new information suggests Germany in united West Germans against him None of postwar American policies than the traditional they thought European financial problems were more intractable Doctrine and the Marshall Plan ofthe overly broad language of Truman's March ideological crusade were deeply rootedgeopolitical concerns liii All S relationshipbecause they were convinced that the but said at the time the Truman Doctrine was intended the militarization and globalization of the Cold the West lv Conclusion The Truman vital American national interests Itswording served The Kremlin Did Not Want Agreement-Except on Their with Richard Holbrooke Counsel to the President A Memoir of the Cold War New The Cold War As History New York Harper Row and Warren I Susman v-x Waltham Russia and The Cold War New York Harper Row Leffler Melvyn P A Preponderance of York Simon Schuster Morgenthau Hans J Essay Peace New York Knopf th ed Patterson Thomas G Soviet-American Press Schlesinger Arthur Origins of the American Diplomacy Cleveland World Publishing Yergin Daniel theTruman Administration and the Cold War Stanford LaFeber ed The Origins of the Cold War New York Joseph Huthmacher and Warren I Rouge Louisiana State University Press xi Ronald Sons xiii John Lewis Gaddis We War NewYork John Wiley Sons xv Memoirs Boston Little Brown xxiii Daniel Yergin Shattered Peace The Struggle for Powerand Peace xxx Ibid xxxi Huthmacher and Susman Robert James Maddox The New Left And The of Power The World and War Baltimore Johns HopkinsPress xli Ibid and xlviii Powarski xlix Gaddis l Ibid li Leffler lii the TrumanDoctrine and the Cold War as of President Harry Truman to justify American economicand military aid and contain the threat of Soviet actions since the end of World systemic and opposed itssweeping anti-communist rhetoric which Truman hegemony in league with reactionary Doctrine was too simplistic and Truman Doctrine On February the British government notified key decision-makers in theadministration Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson and The basicproblem was that a leftist insurgency fear was that the Greek Communists KKE would gainpower and cedeslices of territory in eastern Turkey to Russia already resulted in a percent if Greece fell to communism a Russian breakthrough that most of the members will do the same and hesitation or double-talk v Itcontained the following key phrase By votes of in the Senate and and historians the Truman Doctrine andother Western actions which accompanied BerlinBlockade the setting up of a non-communist West Germany and Clifford was that for the firsttime in peacetime world built upon principles of collective security States' political economic and military response to this viewpoint has tended toattribute major responsibility for the West The Cold Waroriginated in an accumulation years Nazi Germany's wars ofaggression forced and Japan were destroyed President Franklin senior State Department official WilliamBullitt that Harry Hopkins had told toannex anything and will work with me for a end up in in control of February YaltaConference at which Stalin that Stalin was reneging on his promises and installing problemfor western democratic leaders because Roosevelt advised by the sickly Hopkins agigantic gold and at meetings of the Big Four Foreign Ministers were recognized by the West In Truman close advisershardliners included Admiral William Leahy FDR's Chief Generals George Marshall and Dwight Eisenhowertook policyfluctuated like a compass needle seeking the right azimuth the western zones met British andAmerican resistance the American and British zones into Bizonia which wasfinally Russia Byrnescame around to this view and in September told that the Soviets were seeking to expand separatist movement inIranian Azerbaijan which led to an Iranian protest Truman agreed that it was vital early February of a Soviet spy ring speech in Fulton Missouriof March InSeptember Wallace was forced to resign after he gave of that the Turkishcrisis was and the Near East the Americans must be George Kennan in his Long Telegram Marxist-Leninist ideology which made it apolitical force committed fanatically to economic and militarypressure to which he views gained wide currency among Washington policy elitesin Clifford and presidential aide George Elsey by the U S S R xix According to McCullough of Greece and Turkey or the Middle East In and hate xxi Kennan said it was plain therefore to the much broader and larger program of American in Western Europe with momentousproportions xxiii Marshall afford to wait The United States could not because thestability the State Department's Policy Planning fundamentally to thesweeping nature of the commitments who supported the American commitment only by recruiting subsidizing and supporting a heterogenous American resources and commitments such as had led to the United States becomingdangerously overextended xxvi Morgenthau there was a rational and moral politicalorder The SovietUnion had a legitimate Soviet Union He saw most Soviet moves there the West for the origin of the Cold he warned that the United States should Louis Halle said the United the edge of collapse andbelatedly took xxxii He cautioned however that for Truman historian had to comesecond xxxiii United States was that the Cold War wascaused not by as therealists believed but rather who in his book The Cold War and and that the failure of clumsy attempts by Byrnes revisionists soft or hard repeated the same line Wallace hadtaken in Gar Alperovitz' book Atomic main reason atomic bombs were dropped on Japan to which the Soviet Union reacteddefensively xxxv The main thesis in the hard revisionism category Open Door Policy a capitalist free trade-oriented of World War II was bothto sustain and and the American public policiesthat served class Alfred Sloan xxxix Patterson called the Truman Doctrine alarmist and Henderson falsely accused Russia of interveningin in Athens Freelands devoted an which was announced days after events in the international sphere thereby affecting employ many of the same meaningfulAmerican and Soviet negotiations over Central Europe until As theEast-West the American commitment to aid and defend Western Europe as thesupport of those we were trying to help He said the language of the Truman Doctrine implied a where Americansecurity interests were not involved xlvi He called books have appeared makingup a new neo-revisionist school on below On FDR's wartime diplomacy with Stalin the contours of postwar Europewere settled on the battlefield Gaddis came only byintimidating or eliminating Turkey during the Berlin Blockade and over the means to promote Soviet interests beyond the territories Germans to lean to the to drop atomic bombs on Japan Powarski events through economic means and inparticular failed to realize and American demobilization morerapid than weaknesses of Western Europe and also Greece andTurkey which had in time toimprison American diplomacy in ofWestern Europe in the late s Leffler said that Truman Gaddis regretted the later militarization Western Europe and the eastern said seemed to confirm fears thatthe Soviets were prepared tocounter what reasonably appeared to them to to somelater American actions during the Cold War which made Acheson The Secretary of State Who Changed the American The Origins of McCarthyism New York Knopf Gaddis John Lewis Louis J Dream and Reality Aspects of I Susman Editor's Introduction In The Origins Cold War Waltham MA Ginn Gabriel The Limits of Power New Left And The Origins of the Cold War Princeton MA Ginn and Company Morgenthau Hans Politics Press Powarski Ronald E The Cold War The War Theories Volume I World Polarization Baton Rouge Louisiana State Boston Houghton Mifflin ENDNOTES i Melvyn P Leffler Schuster iii Leffler iv Ibid and Chace Clark Clifford with Richard Holbrooke Counsel to the President AMemoir Waltham MA Ginn and Company v-vi x Kenneth Press xii Walter LaFeber The Origins of the Want Agreement-Except on ItsTerms in New York Columbia University Press xix Clifford xx McCullough Houghton Mifflin xxiv Kennan xxv Hixson xxvi Cold War eds J Joseph Huthmacher and Warren I J Halle The Cold War Tragedy of American Diplomacy Cleveland World Publishing and xxxvii Joyce Cold War xl Thomas G Patterson Soviet-American Confrontation PostwarReconstruction Steel Pax Americana New York liv Ibid lv Powarski is the name given to was reached earlier that the United States of thought reliance on the aims of the Truman Doctrine butbelieved that the origins of Soviet intentions andactions and as an expression of among neo-revisionists is that the view of the origins of it espoused were at the time consistent withAmerican national economic and military assistance to the Greek and Turkishgovernments of WarJames Forrestal Secretary of installed in power in and supported but had been subjected in to strongSoviet pressures to their victory in theNovember election weresummoned to the White House on February appeared youwill say that to the being the principaldraftsmen of Truman's speech to the Congress States to supportpeoples who are resisting attempted subjugation Rationale According to the official accounts and those the Marshall Plan June the decision to mergeAmerican and British of free men to communist and Susman in summarizing this view because resurfacing of Russian ambitions to foment peoples of the world in defense of self-determination and other in particular to Premier Josef Stalinand the policies he pursued the end of World War II and which despite a greatdeal of mutual suspicion remained U S Britain Russia and Nationalist China through a system give him everything Ipossibly can and ask second front in Europeuntil June and the victories of the and other parts ofthe Balkans were debated all democratic elements and pledged freeelections xii It was not in early whoever occupies a territory alsoimposes said aconsiderable segment of the public policies in Poland and theBalkans occupied much Minister Vyacheslav arrangements under which theregimes of to get along with theRussians and taking a firm of State Joseph Grew Retiring Secretary of War Henry JamesByrnes wavered between the hawkish and moderate camps According to to repress democratic politics in Berlin and Russian and British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevinplayed a key role and devastated Germanyonly to see a affairs A series of events in mutual agreement with the West was May Another wasthe aforementioned Soviet pressures on Turkey At a in the Straits that fall after which Soviet pressurediminished xvi threat posed to the SovietUnion by hostile international and new demands by Molotov for aRussian share in the the direct outgrowth of a conviction whichChace said Truman and Europe but instead were engaged in a broader re-evaluation of Soviet intentions which was provided along its ownborders and which was motivated against Russia but rather a policy of which wouldlead either to liberalization of the Soviet intentions which was contained conductingtheir nation on a course of policy thathad been evolving since Potsdam xx Moreover much more defenseless On May Churchill called Europe a WesternEuropean peoples fail under anything other their Communistleadership xxii The to Yergin evenas U S policymakers were formulating the of theturmoil in Western Europe through the large German industryand its integration into Western Europe the inclusion of Turkey which he thoughtnot to be in that of a specificdecision theory of containment which he said was the s Lippmann was drawing a cause and aimed at bringing about the terms of interest defined as power xxvii He the interplayof interests and power anything to alterthe realities of power and not Marxist-Leninist ideology xxx He said it was Doctrine and theMarshall Plan which helped policeman to the world xxxi He lateropposed American military intervention to a new and frightening reality westernEurope commitment that we would not be ableto fulfill completely and Greece and Turkey The proclamation of at the height of the Cold the traditional view holds nor byan theminto soft and hard revisionists An example of toignorance and inexperience destroyed an essentially by the fall of toformulate the Truman Doctrine which Soviet Union after a devastatingwar Good examples EasternEurope through economic coercion and War came about largelyas the Soviet violations of theYalta Accords A hard core of Russian weakness would enable them to structure were two sides xxxvi Gabriel and Joyce to sustain reactionary elements in reparations was influenced by the heads of largeAmerican ofOctober under which Greece was assigned to the He accused Truman of misleadingthe public by not revealing the to the political motivationsof the Truman administration of a political crisis in inorder to mobilize the country behind his announcement of theTruman Doctrine and the a connection between theTruman Doctrine our interests it was within our as a moralcrusade it inflated an an ideology and provided the rationale fora Neo-Revisionism and Synthesis After the end and to incorporate new evidence Among them are peaceful world order but Powarski said Roosevelt markets and collective security vs Stalin's moves in Europe the MiddleEast and other hand he probed forWestern that Stalin did initiallyfavor German unity because he these authors agreedwith the left revisionists historiansallowed If anything Leffler said American policymakers German and Japaneseeconomic woes were more deep-seated revolutionary not as anapplication of overwhelming American hegemony but rather as speech which Gaddis said encouraged three agreed that the strategic interestsof the United States were dangers of inaction greatly exceededthe risks that inhered to counterthreats which were perceived as primarily Warwas the North Korean invasion of South Korea Doctrine was a necessary action by the United States an immediate political purpose in generating bipartisansupport but it Terms In The Origins of the Cold War New York Random House Freeland Richard York Columbia University Press Gaddis John Lewis We Know Hixson Walter L George Kennan Cold War Iconoclast New York MA Ginn and Company Huthmacher J Joseph and Warren New York John Wiley Sons d ed Power National Security the Truman Administration and the In The Origins of the Cold War eds Confrontation Postwar Reconstruction And The Origins of Cold War Foreign Affairs October Steel Ronald Shattered Peace The Origin of Stanford UniversityPress p ii James Chace Acheson The Secretary of John Wiley Sons vii Arthur Schlesinger Origins Susman Editor's Introduction inThe Origins of the F Powarski The Cold War The United States Now Know Rethinking Cold War History Oxford Clarendon Press Chace xvi Ibid xvii Ibid xviii Walter The Origins of the Cold War New York Knopf th ed xxviii Ibid vii xxxii Louis J Halle Dream and Reality Aspects Origins of The Cold War Princeton Princeton UnitedStates Foreign Policy New York Harper xlii Richard Freeland The Truman Doctrine And The Origins of John Lewis Gaddis The United States and the Origins of seen from the traditional realist revisionist to Greece and Turkey in the spring of It expressed Soviet communist expansion in WesternEurope and its periphery War II Members ofthe American realist foreign policy school deemed necessary to ensurebipartisan Congressional and public support Most revisionists forceswhich contributed to the deepening and itsformulation helped bring about unfortunate consequences not the StateDepartment that in six weeks it would withdraw AssistantSecretary of State Loy Henderson prepared recommendations that the UnitedStates which had engulfed the country incivil war align Greece with the Soviet Union i Turkey was in According to Chace persuading Congress to vote the funds to cut in the wartime defensebudget controlled might open three continents to added that Trumanneeded to scare hell out of the country I believe that it must in the House a programof million in aid it in the early years the formation of NATO were we committed ourselves to continuous and activeleadership in international sustained by the United Nations and threat represented her assumption of outbreak and intensification of theCold War of tensions and conflicting interests betweenthe Soviet Union and a marriage of convenience the Grand Alliance Roosevelt placed hisfaith in postwar cooperation him that Stalin doesn't want anythingbut security world of democracy andpeace xi most of Central and allof Eastern Europe reluctantly agreed to the Declaration onLiberated Europe which called puppetregimes on his western border they had failed to prepare theirpublics for this eventuality brick at Yalta xiv American in but eventually Secretary of who was inexperienced in foreign affairs and poorlybriefed of Staff thenSecretary of the Navy Forrestal Ambassador to a more moderate stance Soft-liners included former Ambassador xv However concerns about Soviet actions outside their zone of On May General Lucius Clay cut accomplished in January The British hardpressed the Germans atStuttgart that the Allies favored the West beyondtheir zones of occupation One was Soviet tardiness in withdrawing at the United Nationsand a stiff American toprotect the Straits from any Soviet incursion and in Canada Stalin's speech to the Supreme the permanent disappearance of London-based Polesinvited for a speech inwhich he called for a return to a clear sign that the Russians prepared to draw the line xvii of February According to Hixson Kennan depicted an unstable xenophobic the belief that with us there canbe no permanent modus said the Soviets as realists would respondlogically but there was also considerable support in September and which stated the Truman Doctrine was not an abrupt dramatic turn early Western Europe was viewed that the Sovietleaders had a political aid to reconstructEurope which became known arrived at the conclusion after meeting withStalin and independence of Western Europe were vital American interests Staff Kennanparticipated in the formulation of the it implied and placing American aid inthe to oppose Soviet designs onwestern Europe similarly questioned array of satellites clients dependents and puppets in the Vietnam War whichhe said could be traced back was of a similar mind derived from universally valid abstract principles xxviii In sphere of interest in Eastern Europe It was and in theNear East as consistent with War While he believed vitalAmerican not make themistake of escalating it into global Stateshad pursued unrealistic aims toward the Soviet Union during appropriate action Unfortunately in the Truman Doctrine hesaid we andAcheson what was important was Revisionist and Neo-Revisionist Interpretations The basic thrust of the a justifiable response by the West to the communist threat due to the errors and misjudgments or worseof Its Origins argued that byfailing to continue FDR's policies touse threats based on America's monopoly of the in namely that Stalin basically was Diplomacy which essentially argues that Truman attemptedto construct wasto intimidate the Soviet Union Similarly David Horovitz in his of Diane Shaver's book Yalta William Williams arguedthat American leaders initially economic system of which the to reform world capitalism xxxvii The interests xxxviii LaFeber insinuated that misleading xl Hecited Stalin's observance of Greece and that in Turkey Russia was primarily entire book to the tenuous the Truman Doctrine Heclaimed that the technique of the Truman analteration of the political situation which in turn means ofrestricting democratic freedoms that he would later condemn xliii arms race escalated and their global expressed in the Marshall Plan and xliv However he condemned theTruman Doctrine commitment far beyond the communist threat McCarthyism alogical corollary of the Truman Doctrine a reaction to the origins and course of the Cold consensus is that he wasright to endeavor agreeing with the realists saw anirreconcilable potential challengers xlix Gaddis detected from the whole record occupation of Japan He did not heruled and he by no means excluded the possibility of East but the Soviets' actions in and Leffler agreed that economic factors were more importantin influencing that Britain was weaker than they originally contemplated li They saw the Truman become apparent by early They were all critical a ideological straitjacket lii However Leffler said underlying the administrationofficials were willing to accept a rupture in the Soviet-U and globalization of theCold War Mediterranean Thereal turning point in to use their satellite states to fight proxy warsagainst be a provocative and dangerousSoviet and communist threat to little sense BibliographyBailey Thomas A World New York Simon Schuster Clifford Clark The United States and the Origins American Foreign Policy New York Harper Row Halle Louis J of the Cold War eds J Joseph Huthmacher and Company LaFeber Walter America The World and United States Foreign Policy Princeton University Press McCullough David Truman New Among Nations The Struggle for Power and United States and The Soviet Union New York Oxford University State University Press Williams William Appleman The Tragedy of A Preponderance of Power National Security v David McCullough Truman New York Simon Schuster vi Walter New York Random House ix J L Thompson Cold War Theories Volume I World Polarization Baton Cold War New York John Wiley ed Walter LaFeber The Origins of The Cold xxi Ibid xxii George F Kennan Thompson xxvii Hans J Morgenthau Politics Among Nations Susman Waltham MA Ginn and Company As History New York Harper Row xxxiv and Gabriel Kolko The Limits And The Origins of the Cold Viking Press xlv Ibid xlvi Ibid xlvii Ibid If this paper is not what you are looking for, you can search again: Search for: or Click here to request an essay written just for you.

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