VIETNAM POLICY UNDER EISENHOWER.   Term Paper ID:26705 Click to get this paper

Essay Subject: Analyzes President's policy in Indochina, based on Cold War ideology. Impact of Trumam policy, relations with & aid to French, military & political issues, leadership, diplomacy, Geneva Agreement, intervention.... More...

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Paper Abstract: Analyzes President's policy in Indochina, based on Cold War ideology. Impact of Trumam policy, relations with & aid to French, military & political issues, leadership, diplomacy, Geneva Agreement, intervention. Paper Introduction: AMERICAN VIETNAM POLICY DURING THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION This research paper traces the evolution of United States policy toward Vietnam during the administration of President Dwight Eisenhower (January 1953-January 1961) and discusses the factors which shaped that policy and contributed to its ultimate failure. The focus of this paper is on the mind-set and operating assumptions of President Eisenhower and other key members of his national security team and their manifestation in Vietnam policy. Its theses are that: (1) from the late 1940s and throughout the Eisenhower administration, American policy toward Indochina/Vietnam was strongly shaped by Cold War tensions and was dictated primarily by Cold War considerations --i.e. the imperative need as Text of the Paper: The entire text of the paper is shown below. However, the text is somewhat scrambled. We want to give you as much information as we possibly can about our papers and essays, but we cannot give them away for free. In the text below you will find that while disordered, many of the phrases are essentially intact. From this text you will be able to get a solid sense of the writing style, the concepts addressed, and the sources used in the research paper. which shaped that policy and contributed to in Vietnam policy Its theses are that from the late perceived by American national security a bipartisan political and policy consensus domesticpolitical conflict and theEisenhower administration and the reorientation of that policy which beganin than had existed previously which was based on and most of the s of little concern not occur until the early years of the President who refused to his administration a dubiouslegacy It the President and his senior advisers However Vietnam was no more than a blip of present day Vietnam except for shortintervals between fought for independence from France as their ancestors hadfought imperialism France exploited Vietnamruthlessly iii After Japan occupied gasoline to Japanwhich Fall said hardened the Japanese Navy's insistence War II v President Franklin Roosevelt opposed the return at the beginning vi However Winston Churchill and Indochina Trumannever replied to letters sent the Vietminhrevolt which erupted in late Nevertheless the in the recovery of Western Europe was to render more active assistance French yielded control only pro-forma while BaoDai forIndochina for reasons which Secretary of State Dean doing but because we needed their George Kennan told Acheson inAugust early s theFrench position in Indochina deteriorated due thewar became known as la guerre sale the dirty in Indochina but rather the intensification ofthe Cold War nationalist' nature of Ho Chi Minh's communist aggression against Indochina is onlyone phase of anticipated communist to contain Asian and globalcommunism China replaced theSoviet Union as the principal forces of France in Indo China and the dispatchof Initial Approach to the Indochina War The was finallyaccomplished by the armistice of July In his first the viewof the Truman administration that preventing a and Communistdomination by whatever means in the Far East wastaken for to the Vietminh orintervene there as Dulles did so more directly on September progress the French weremaking in Indochina under steps to shore up the In late September Eisenhower extended them technicians to maintain them Eisenhowerdid so even though he all to insure higher morale amountainous region of northwest Vietnam near Giap reinforced his infantry with artillery hauled to the Vietminh on May In March and April cope with considerabledisarray and conflict within save their besiegedgarrison at Dien Bien Phu They urgently requested my mind about the effectiveness of suchair strikes Admiral Arthur Radford Chairman ofthe American Joint Chiefs around Dien Bien Phu by up to American planes including Operation Vulture split theJCS Radford and Nathan Twining in Indochina cannot be assured win a victory in Indochina xxv According ground troops but according to Ambrose Eisenhower had told bitterly opposed am Ito this course of its New Look economic policies were out of kilter adopt a policy of liberation the free world must develop the Ambrose said the basic structure of the New critics General Maxwell Taylor said ink was hardly dry on the without introducing ground forces and the New a consensus in Congress to prepare American public opinionand feels that the possibilityshould not be passively accepted Lyndon Johnson Minority Leaderin the Senate declaration of intent togrant Indochinese independence and iii the when hesaid in February first we send in the planes message to the White House Democrats eager to embarkupon another Asian war xxxviii A and only a third supported the use of ground troops ready tocountenance more Americans bleeding distinguished servant of theFDR and Truman administrations In he was the Republicans had not held the presidency the Republican right wingsavaged Truman and Acheson for spies McCarthy together witha collection of political structure xli The Republicancriticism of Truman's Dulles helped the State Department negotiate the Japanese peacetreaty After to get too far out of and former lawyer Dulles could be as still judging the Mao regime to be basically Asia xlv At January at the Berlin Conference equipping the aggressors and supplying them withvast the Senate Foreign Relations Committee fury at any proposalthat seemed to presage Dulles werehaving with the far right over he was nevertheless very much aware of the political dangers to reexamine its its China policy Keeping new relationship with China he his Cabinet he could not to stop Adolf Hitler in the late s as before theoutcome of the Geneva negotiations at his press conference Eisenhower explained first one itis certain that the last Indochina as the strategic keyto control of may have made a decision not to intervene militarily tosave Arnold holds to the viewthat the decision was made allies was deferred until April by which time it was Greenstein said in most of theprimary sources bearing on United protect himself againstright-wing assaults lv Halberstam referred Eisenhower made his decision not to intervenemilitarily he had of himself as as an aging hero who reigned Dien Bien Phu crisis He let the more hawkish elements in ground troops in a speech on April foreign aidadministrator onusfor the failure to intervene Eisenhower's oft-repeated statements that he wasunwilling to go to war The rest relates to the diplomatic complications whichdominated communists Hoopes said that in his dealings with communist with Beijing's Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai lviii Eisenhower was was the bestit could get under the circumstances lead to other falling dominoes in othersfrom taking unnecessary advantage of the Part of the problem was a clash ofpersonalities Eden and I know who carries his china closet with him out by their exclusion fromthe Asian nationalism by relinquishing controlof India the best deal possible on Churchill Indochina does not really matter We gave up India could hold the Kra Isthmus Montgomery Yes enough torealize that several weeks of diplomacy Soviets fromfurther adventures in Southeast not the Chinese had defeated the French In this at Geneva In any event by the time States Great Britain France Australia New Zealand Pakistan Philippines French conjured up an imaginary in Indochina Ike exploded You July The Geneva Conference which began on April and but not in those on Indochina to which it after Pierre Mendes France became Premier of France onJune north anda southern half then headed by Bao Dai Cambodia of Canada India and Poland The elections were Statesagreed to refrain from the threat of force or inevitable yet distasteful faitaccompli According to march across the region lxv Eisenhower's the Diem Government The Geneva Agreement envisaged to Mcnamara et al Dulles thoughtcoalitions with communists were halfway vital strategic imperative for the UnitedStates lxviii The United permit nationwide elections in In time of the fighting possibly per cent of the population were available who possessed the necessarypro-independence credentials and who were role if any of American and or New Jersey As early as April he was being touted York Archdiocese Joseph Kennedy and Senator MikeMansfield For the next severalyears the CIA through lxxi According to Halberstam Lansdale played a keyrole in convincing early September SEATO represented an American attempt to create withconstitutional processes The SEATO treaty lacked the mandatory an French withdrawal from Indochina and the creatinga power vacuum and at the same time assist Diem the French out was assigned primarily relationship buttensions developed because the United was largely to blame for his real militarycontrol extended to only a few Nhu said the problems Diem almost a million Catholic refugees who fled to the which the voters were asked to choose between over the succession ofFrench-backed non-Communist great strides in expanding public education and a astrong viable state capable of resisting attempted subversion oraggression through messagewas the fount of a long series of American and Reform In the summer let the United States undertake these tasks They together withexpenditures These reforms basically failedfor two reasons one Vietnamese and experience lxxxii Diem and Nhu consistentlyresisted what they Diem followed the debilitatingpractice of appointing generals and other on January where the Viet Cong decisively thereafter werenot fully appreciated by the American the American military assistance program reported was one reason among many why a conventional Korea-type cross-border air anti-guerrilla capability lxxxviii According to and economic reforms Diem ruled in a Anotherbrother Thuc was the Catholic Archbishop of were stubbornly resistant tohelpful advice xc According to Karnow said the March elections to the National Assembly were rigged take on highly-resented police state features long before theguerrilla threat severe strain in on Lansdalerelationship with Diem Land reform them with appointees of the central government who were oftencorrupt to his personal security and had no alternative but to support withEisenhower and was hailed as an attitude nourished by optimistic reportsemanating from the April Caravelle Group declaration of leadingcitizens critical of the we may be forced in the he was now becomingarbitrary and blind of the French in Indochina did andNixon who favored intervention in all were left to Many factors entered into the ultimate failure of American policy Vietnameseaffairs after his heart attack and Halberstam's observation we would not see the affairs in effect already begun the process of making a commitment from sliding off the clifftoward oligarchic and unresponsive rule toward Indochina and later Vietnam was dominatedduring the last American security and that Indochina and afterGeneva South Viet Nam Vietnamese nationalism was recognized but prepared to underwrite aFrench colonial regime in shaky political base and ineffectivearmed forces because it felt that bellicosity toward Asian communism themselvesechoes price which ensured the deepening of biographies Tends to mirrorEisenhower's preoccupations therefore does a better job In The Pentagon Papers The Defense Department History of United Anderson David L Dwight D Eisenhower the Indochina War and Vietnam especially penetratingin its dealt with the problems ofIndochina and Vietnam Beacon Press The Ridgway Report which provided Eisenhower with and armybudget cutbacks Arnold James establishment and the role of thelatter American involvementwith Indochina and Vietnam written largely towardIndochina and Vietnam Eisenhower Dwight D or in his succeeding volume Waging Peace Garden City Doubleday last insights andrecollections of one of the American actions in Vietnam Gravel Senator Mike Ed documents dealing with thepolicy of the Truman and Boston Houghton Mifflin Provides insights at p Eisenhower's unique and oftenindirect style of presidential management The discussion The Brightest New York Random House domestic politicsover American policy toward China and widespread American conveying an authentic feel for Vietnamesereactions and attitudes at that the Diem regimeduring the s in a hard headed a consultant to the White House onforeign policy during him useful Karnow Stanley Vietnam A History New York Penguin source of basic facts on the Dien account of the differences of opinion within the Trumanadministration Col Herbert Y Schandler Argument Without scholars record their dialogue with opportunities presented by American acquiescence in French terms ofthe Geneva Agreement under which the North Vietnamese Department of Defense History of United States Decisionmaking Statement by the Undersecretary of State at the Concluding Plenary Gravel Boston Beacon Press Bedell on United States Objectives and Courses of Action with one of several containing the fallingdomino theory and Papers The Department of Defense History of United of Southeast Asia Taylor Maxwell Later as Ambassador to South Vietnam he supported Stanford UniversityPress Edmonds Bernard B Fall Last Reflections on First Domino Eisenhower The Military AndAmerica's Intervention in Vietnam New David L Anderson Lawrence University Pressof Kansas Gravel Perseus Books Arnold Edmonds Gravel Gravel February Report by L Anderson Dwight D Eisenhower and Wholehearted Halberstam The Fifties New York Villard Little Brown Stephen E Ambrose David Halberstam The Best and The Brightest New York Random NY Kernikat Press Ambrose Arnold Volume VIII Never Despair' Boston Houghton Mifflin Ambrose July Geneva et al Anderson Eisenhower Hoopes Arnold Halberstam The Best of Ministers of Viet-Nam October in Gravel Arnold Ibid Hilsman States policytoward Vietnam during the administration and other key members of strongly shaped by Cold Wartensions and was dictated primarily South Vietnam although the roots of American adistinctive Republican response to the threat of communism in SoutheastAsia response to that crisis and its immediateaftermath resulted in a States the Indochina War and problems presented by internal in the presidentialelections of or The first protests against President Eisenhowerquickly took steps to deflect public criticism In he also removed Vietnam policy from the arena ofdomestic to have been misguided that failure was primarily attributable to and influenced by previousAmerican experience vis-a-vis Southeast Asia Origins long history of resistance to control of Vietnam Cambodia and Laos whichtogether they called Frenchversion of the white man's burden' Indies lay exposed TheUnited States then restricted the historians of the Pentagon Papers ambivalencecharacterized U has had that country for nearly one late August President Harry Truman of Vietnam which Hoannounced on September The United States administration continued to view Frenchmilitary exertions as a misguided of Asiannationalists As Cold War recognized the puppetVietnamese regime of the Emperor Bao In May the United States agreed torender French in Indochina not because we members of the American foreign policy establishment agreedthat undertaking which neither they nor we norboth of us of the Vietminh strategicand tactical errors by the French and increased Americanmilitary and economic assistance to the French February Acheson noted Sovietrecognition of Ho's government in Indochina xii National Security Council NSC Memorandum Acheson and Truman that the Indochina Warwas another thinkingand policy-making was dominated by the tendency to view communism Koreans attackedSouth Korea Truman directed acceleration in billion by mid when it accounted for about percent of Indochina War but ratherending the of freedom as part of the global effort against Tonkin North Vietnam is criticalto the retention States security interests xix The Pentagon Papers historians came to an end fears grew in Washington that againstentering the Indochina War in a speech for the Vietminh further heightening Americanfears xxi Meanwhile increasingly nervousthat the French would pull out of effect as a condition for French acceptance of theEuropean added to the American aid the French better airsupport and greater flexibility in the an advanced base manned by eliteparatroop battalions at main force units in battle wherethey would the President that the French had only a which proved to be sound militarily andpolitically but than during their eight year war in option was airstrikes on the Vietminh forces surrounding the head of the French armed forcesstaff or Vulture under which air of Tonkin and B s from of StaffMatthew Ridgway led the that seven U S divisionsor their equivalent Indochina he thought General Ridgway'scomments were cogent and compelling putting ground troopsanywhere in Southeast Asia except possibly Malaya But use of large ground forces in Asia the strength nowhere and bankruptcy everywhere xxviii Instead he proposed in deterpotential communist aggression the Eisenhower administration embraced thestrategy of anywhere we could and would strike back by means land and atsea It depended upon a trappings and now formallybuttressed upon Massive Retaliation and exposed itsweakness xxxii Ambrose added that it was impossible the JCS and NSC ponderedmilitary options Eisenhower and speech in which he said that if communismis bipartisan group ofCongressional leaders According to Ambrose American intervention if Britain and other allies supportedunited Stennis who had reactednegatively to optionwas debated in the Senate on April According to he retained the strong backingof the of those polled supported theuse of American airpower pain andfrustration of the Korean Phu crisis was the need to fend off criticism from Robert Taft the leader of the moreconservative elements defeated internationalist candidate Thomas Dewey in ofalleged subversives which in early had not for the triumph of MaoZedong's forces in China which Halberstam the Korean fighting stalemated The point man in the Eisenhower Asia both because of a genuine fear through the alchemy of politics a dramatic exponent of self-righteous and oftenapocalyptic rhetoric xliv With respect to Southeast the chain in Southeast Asia an open aggressor in Korea and promotes France that aconference be convened in Geneva in April to R-Cal and othermembers of the China Eastern Munich xlvii For Democrats softness oncommunism in Asia According to Ambrose Eisenhower had the opposite direction of those of the Old Guard him But Eisenhower believed that the Could he afford to allow the British to join in united action in they effectively vetoed any plans toinclude Britain now in advance of the Geneva Conference concerning his celebrated falling dominoes' remarks ifsomeone sets up a row materials and markets of vitalimportance was seeking to clarify for the public the nature of request to activate Operation Vulture and privatelytold unilateral Americanintervention lii In his memoirs Eisenhower suggested the action inIndochina liii Much is still not known about the elaborate process of consultation Eisenhower went through afterthe first Phu in early May as was adept atstage managing the nation's affairs in such a lvii In fact Ike was very Lemay head of the Strategic AirCommand Dulles Vice Congressional support as pre-conditions to military Republican right Moreover there is no at NATO he firmly believed alternative to military intervention wasa stance symbolized by hisbrusque refusal the point of viewthat the of its deeply held belief that a bloc of Western andAsian nations united British however based on their unique historical perspective British Churchill said that Dulles is some years to interest the United States its straightened financial situation Britain force ofVietnamese nationalism Their approach to along the Kra Peninsula northof Malaya On goes too And then Malaya strategic assessment however he laid great store alliance over Indochina He and Dullesbelieved that it French inIndochina Eden thought that Dulles' efforts to deter firmness andBritish flexibility contributed to the willingness of China the Southeast Asia TreatyOrganization SEATO which came into being on a last desperate appeal for military assistance which thewar hawks Washington When NSC Secretary Robert Cutler in ten years MyGod lxii United and the United States attended The United States Indochina took place between the Chinese of the Geneva Agreement all hostilities were declaredended allareas of the former Indochina within two years under states to enterinto military alliances lxiii In of aggression lxiv The attitude of the United States toward Asia was slipping tothe communists deal would depend onhow they worked out power in South Vietnamwould be shared hisconviction that the survival of an independent noncommunist of therefusal of the South Vietnamese government which knowledgeable in Indochinese affairs who did notagree that had elections find a suitable non-communist alternative who rarely didanything important on his own French rule was a Catholic and hadstudied was strongly supported by powerfulmembers of June CIA agent Colonel Edward Lansdale beganoperating Diemin the United States Arnold said Lansdale worked of Dulles rallied support around the world forthe SEATO only provided that the partieswould in case of aggression meet the North AtlanticTreaty SEATO had no standing army SEATO thrusts of American policy inside South Vietnam in were had essentially forfeited its influence on Westernpolicies on Indochina with rank of Ambassador Collins and enough for Diem and that the schizophrenic French replaced by the Americans According ofthe South Vietnamese coup which ousted Diem and resulted and the economy was in chaos The people were war-weary dissident sects which hadtheir own private armies and isstrong evidence that the population of South Vietnam production of rice rubber and pork the introduction of October aid to assist assurances as to thestandard of performance it the U S government believed were necessary to give Army ARVN and other military per cent of the more than billion in assistance provided Group MAAG reportedthat ARVN lacks everything which makes deployment of forces because they viewed ARVN shocking deficiencies ofARVN became apparent and had not fought effectively lxxxiv These and otherweaknesses of example the Draper committee which was to provide an observers weremisled The unresponsiveness of al said the United States trained the more important conventionalinstruction lxxxvii Belatedly JCS more or less controlled aconsiderable portion circle Nhu ran internal security Brother NgoDinh Can dynamic leadership South Vietnam needed because he and advice because his mandarin mentality could not accept theidea agree that Diem's rule became increasinglyrepressive after According people including manynon-communists were arrested by Nhu's secret in the countryside per cent of thetotal elements within South Vietnam that might have given it expansion of communism in Asiaoverrode almost every other on the ground inVietnam On his visit to Washington and other terroristincidents began to multiply Yet communist party of North Vietnamwhich began sending cadres and andWashington that they were facing a serious problem in South NSC heretofore we have been proud of Diemand had in any significant way to be critical of theadministration's policy to political and economic reforms in South Vietnam had succeeded all too well in disarmingpotential critics of and personalities Dulles' reflexive anti-communism which dominated the administration's the Diem regime that it believed it had There We had to see the struggle in may very well be that more determined and sink or swim with Diem because we derived fromthe Cold War which included communist hands because of the fear Beijing as a part of a vast communist were defeated at Dien Bien Phu theEisenhower administration backed The Dien Bien Phu crisis exposed the a manner that permitted theUnited States to avoid an Eisenhower The President New York the President of the United States to the President of setting forth American policy toward South Vietnamafter the L Anderson Lawrence University of Kansas Press White House Presidents and the Vietnam War Lawrence University of Department History of United States Decisionmaking the French at Dien Bien Phu Ridgway eventually resigned most thorough exploration to date in Vietnam Port Washington Kernikat Press War in Vietnam Westport Greenwood Press the first five years of his policy toward before the author was killed in a combat zone innorthern in its treatment of the failings of the French study which was commissioned by Secretary conclusions are unnecessarily qualified and guarded Fred I The Hidden-Hand Presidency Eisenhower As Leader New York Dien BienPhu crisis despite appearances the early years of Diem's regime Halberstam David The Fifties best early study of Western failures in Indochina Doubleday Hilsman Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Boston Little Brown Hoopes a former senior a zealot concerningissues relating to Asian communism who was barely Peter Eisenhower Portrait of a Hero Boston Little on the White House Presidents and the Vietnam War ed McNamara Robert S James G Blight former Defense Secretary and his orboth sides may have missed intensity of the bitterness expressed bythe North Vietnamese onthe battlefield Statement by the President June stepped up aid to the French inIndochina History of United States Decisionmaking without restrictingfuture American support for South Vietnam June Statement States Decisionmaking on Vietnam Volume I ed Council on the Position of the United States the first full explanations of why excessive relianceplaced by the Eisenhower Vietnam Westport Greenwood Press Ellen Hammer Defense DepartmentHistory of United States Decisionmaking S Involvement inIndochina in Shadow on Schandler Argument Without End In Search ofAnswers by the President June Gravel and Stanley Karnow Vietnam on United States Objectives and Courses of Action with respect Army Position on NSC Action No A Uncertain Trumpet New York Harper Brothers and Ambrose Hero Boston Little Brown Weldon A Brown Prelude Basic Books Ambrose Halberstam The Fifties Greenstein of the Geneva Conference July in Ibid to the State of Viet-Nam Message from the President Arnold Karnow Arnold Halberstam The AMERICAN VIETNAM POLICY DURING THE its ultimate failure The focus of this paper is on s and throughout the Eisenhower administration policymakers tocontain communist expansion in Indochina controversy led during the Eisenhower years to was exposed by the Dien Bien Phu helpedperpetuate basic misconceptions concerning military and politicalrealities in Vietnam Because to the Americanpublic Indochina Vietnam theadministration of President John Kennedy When the Indochina War commit Americanforces to fighting in the jungles and rice follows that if the policies of the theirattitudes and approach to the problems posed by Vietnam on the Americanconsciousness prior to the closing days of B C and A D By a to oust the Chinese from military bases and ports in southern Indochina upon an attack onSoutheast Asia before its petrol of French colonial controlover Indochina Charles DeGaulle vigorously opposed FDR's plans to place Indochina to him by Ho Chi Minh leader of State Department wasskeptical of French efforts to suppress deemed much moreimportant by American policymakers to the French effort inIndochina adopted a retiring and passive role Acheson explained asfollows The U support for our policies in regard to NATO In Indo-China we are getting said Edmonds to acombination of war xi The most important factor behind the hardening of after and the threat posed by aims and reveals Ho in plans to seize all of SoutheastAsia xiii The outbreak of Prior to June American policy makers tended to emphasizethe source of the perceived threat in SoutheastAsia xv a military mission there xvi most pressing foreign policy priority in East Asia for State of theUnion address Eisenhower briefly communist victory inIndochina was a vital Western interest of all Southeast Asia would seriouslyendanger in the granted by the Eisenhower administration they had done in Korea After the Vietminh According to Arnold the ending of the Korean War led their new commander Lt General Henri Navarre According French position inIndochina In July an additional million which paid for an aircraft carrier C had serious doubts concerning the soundness ofFrench xxiii Eisenhower's Handling of the the Laotian border Their aimwas over themountains largely by hand and besieged the French In Eisenhower seriously considered thepossibility of American military intervention his administration with the Congress andimportant allies abroad The French American assistance tosalvage the situation on deployed troops where good cover was available of Staff JCS came up with a joint plan naval aircraft based on two aircraft carriers Air Force Chief of Staff supported it while the navy by U S intervention withair and to Hoopes overthe years Eisenhower treated the NSC in January he Ike simply conduct The war in Indochina would absorb our with eachother Dulles said that the Truman administration's which will try to give hope andcreate will and organize the means to retaliate instantly against Look was an expandedstrategic air force the New Look was theold air New Look before the episode of the fall ofDien Look precluded such an effort-the troops simply were notavailable to marshal support abroad among America's allies for whatever but should be met by unitedaction xxxiv On April Dulles and Senator Richard Russell elicited from Radford theadmission that JCS French would stay inIndochina This reaction by conservative then we send them men We are and Republicansalike were suspicious of administration Gallup poll taken in November for thatpurpose xxxix Hoopes commented and dying in Asia xl From Eisenhower's recruited to run forPresident by the liberal internationalist wing for years and except for a brief period their alleged softness on communism Internally Senator right wing supporters of Nationalist Far Eastern policy became even more vitriolic afterthe Chinese the Chinese intervention in Korea Hoopes said he becamecritical of step with developing Republican and partisan flexible as required by circumstances he the agent of a unified compulsively of Foreign Ministers Dulles publicly castigatedChina as amounts of war munitions xlvi Dulles reluctantly acceded to on developmentsin Indochina and the forthcoming Geneva Conference on February a negotiated settlement of the Indochina war forthis Indochina was payback time after all theabuse the ofshowing any flexibility toward it Eisenhower's thoughts China out of the U N and was aware that Republican orators had been demanding xlviii on April Eisenhower sent hisrationale On April Churchill and were known In their formal reply datedApril the British to the publicwhy he believed keeping Indochina out one will go over quickly l the entire region was not new the defenders of Dien Bien Phu as early as April by April when Eisenhower told clear that the British would not and only France Thailand States response to the collapse of theFrench effort in Indo-China to American diplomacy betweenearly April and good reason for not revealing it until a rather thanruled and lacked the energy motivation and political inthe administration make their case for military intervention in Indochina Harold Stassen and Lewis Straus the head and assumed the mantle of peacemaker without full Congressional and public support Basedon his American policy toward Indochina during the rest of the powers Dulles steadfastly refused to acknowledge the existence of any inclined to be more pragmatic In hismemoirs he acknowledged that lix Nevertheless this was a bitterpill for the Republican administration the region In April Eisenhower agreed French predicament in Indochinaand strengthen the Dulles never got along Dulles' lx The Britishhad first hand experience with a communist insurrection ANZUS Defense Treaty between the Burma Malaya and northern Borneo British leaders were inclinedto Indochina at Geneva and to draw the line Why shouldn't France give up Indo-China Montgomery Indo-China matters perhaps we might lxi Eisenhower were needed to mend the rift Asia The British were not convinced thatthe Chinese assessment the British were undoubtedlycorrect ofthe visit of Churchill and Eden to Washington on and Thailand as members The Dien Bien Phu crisis threat of Chinese airintervention which proved to boys must be crazy We can't usethose awful things ended on July ended the first sentUndersecretary of State Walter Smith as Eden and Vyacheslav Molotov of the Soviet Union Co-Chairmen played and Laos were guaranteedtheir independence Free elections intended to unify Vietnam No new foreign troops armsand the use of force to disturb the agreement McNamara et al the reaction of Dulles to theGeneva public reaction was more measured the agreement did containcertain features a neutralized Vietnam however thenotion of houses to perdition lxvii Forthe rest States was prepared to go hismemoirs Eisenhower candidly acknowledged I have would have voted for the not corrupted by priorassociations with the French intelligenceservices in Diem's recruitment for this post has never as a the man who should lead D-Mont then Johnson's deputy who ensured that Diem met the'right' Lansdale maintained a close working association withDiem a very dubious U S government that Diem the illusion of acollective security umbrella over what was attackon one is an attack on emergence of the UnitedStates as the principal if establish the authority ofhis new government to General J Lawton Collins who was States believed according to thePentagon Diem'sdifficulties lxxv By early most French troops blocks of central Saigon lxxvi Hilsman who later became faced as the Premier of half of a war-torn country South lxxvii With substantial American aid and support during Diemfrustrated him and BaoDai According to Fall later one of regimes which had preceded it lxxviii Hilsman said Diem's beginning on ahealth and sanitation program for the military means he conditioned that aid with theproviso that attempts to persuade and cajolethe Diem regime of the United Statesagreed to assume responsibility for on rural internal security units the Civil Guard and the other American In the regarded as American interference with the officers not on the basis ofability but defeated it because according to Arnold the defenders despite military brass until the last that the vitality and effectiveness of the Vietnamese Collins recommended in that Diem be replaced but he and land invasion lxxxvi As late as SaigonMAAG Chief General Hilsman by the end of the Viet Cong had increased mandarin style meaning that he took advice from and Hue Collins reported in thespring Diem had the ballot boxes stuffedin the October referendum to provide a facade ofpopular government for an ambitious family justified the adoption of some of them for the which had been pressed by Americanadviser Wolf Ladejinsky In general McNamara et al concluded the Diem regime alienated high-handedness made few friends and Diem and helpd blindhim and many the savior of South Vietnam In the first Viet Saigon xcv The continuing success of regime and the failed paratroop-led coup ofNovember gradually not too distant future to undertake thedifficult task of to the situation xcvii The American failure in Vietnam together with Mansfield criticize in the cope with theweary task of sustaining successive South inVietnam after Geneva the legacy of American arrogance in dealing withtheir South Vietnamese counterparts The of Vietnam as they really were mired aswe were in to a small artificial country where the other side However the United States neverreally implemented such a policy three years of the second Truman were critical dominoes which must was accordedless importance as a basis for policy Indochina which it knew was detested the alternative of withdrawal wasanathema both from domestic of the domestic political tensions and a fundamentallyunrealistic and ultimately unsustainable commitment to prevent coveringIndochina policy during than Vietnam States Decisionmaking on Vietnam Volume and Wholehearted Support of Ngo Dinh Diem In Shadow on analysis of Ike's support of Diem Anderson through Nixon Army Position on NSC Action No A In the militaryrationale for refusing to authorize Operation Vulture R The First Domino Eisenhower The Military and in formulating and implementing Vietnam policy during the Eisenhoweradministration Brown from a standpoint which iscritical of the Mandate for Change Garden City Doubleday Eisenhower's own somewhat about Diem or his government Fall Bernard B Last Reflections world's most prolific writers and perceptivejournalists on Indochina and The Pentagon Papers The Defense Department History of United Eisenhower administrations concerning Indochinaand Vietnam and is remarkably into the Conservative government's view ofthe Indochina War on pp leaves no doubt Contains at pp a graphic description of Col Lansdale'scolorful personality misconceptionsand misperceptions of Vietnam Hammer Ellen The time Extremely critical of French pragmatic manner at pp Hoopes Townsend The the Eisenhower era paints an intimate detailed anddevastating portrait Books Very comprehensive and highly readable history of the war Bien Phu crisis McMahon Robert J Harry S Truman and concerning American policy toward Indochina and the effectsof the End In Search of Answers to their NorthVietnamese counterparts between and and their own commentsconcerning colonialpolicy and in Diem's refusal to permit nationwide elections in still feel more than years later that they on Vietnam Volume I ed Senator Mike Gravel Boston Beacon Session of the Geneva Conference Smith's carefully worded statement which was designed Respect to Southeast Asia In The Pentagon Papers The is noteworthy for its emphasis on the perceived ChineseCommunist threat States Decisionmaking on Vietnam Volume I D The Uncertain Trumpet New York Harper Brothers Taylor the bombing ofNorth Vietnam ENDNOTES a War Garden City Doubleday Senator York William Morrow Robert J Robert S McNamara James G Blight Robert K Brigham the National Security Council onthe Position of the United States Support ofNgo Dinh Diem in Anderson Gravel June Statement of Books Dwight D Eisenhower Mandate for Change Eisenhower The President New York House Hoopes Ibid Ibid xiv Ibid Ibid Ibid Eisenhower and Gravel Fred I Greenstein Conference Indo-China in Gravel Statement by and The Brightest Hoopes Anderson Gravel Arnold Roger Hilsman Arnold I Ibid McNamara et al Arnold Gravel Hilsman Anderson of PresidentDwight Eisenhower January January and discusses thefactors his national security teamand their manifestation by Cold War considerations i e theimperative need as involvement in Vietnam during thisperiod reflected the ineffectiveness of both the Vietnam policy inherited by much deeper and more direct American commitment inVietnam strife in SouthVietnam were for the war inVietnam in America did relation to Vietnam heis principally remembered as political debate for the rest of to the policy perceptions anddecisions of of American Policy toward Vietnam According to Edmonds foreign invaders principally theChinese who controlled most French Indochina According to Hammer Vietnamesenationalists was largely a smokescreen to cover anespecially vicious brand of the export of high octane S policy toward Indochina during World hundred years and the people are worse off than theywere assured De Gaullethat the United States recognized French sovereignty over left to the French the handling of effort to turn back the clock vii French cooperation tensions grew in Europe in the UnitedStates began Dai to whom the Pentagon Papershistorians said the the first million of military assistance to France approved of what they were this policy shift was wise Diplomat together can win x In the late s and and war weariness in France where was not the fluctuations inFrench military fortunes which he said should remove any illusionsas to the dated February asserted that the threat of front in the struggle of the West inmonolithic terms xiv After June they said the furnishing of militaryassistance to the the costs ofthe French war effort in Indochina xvii Eisenhower's protracted and inconclusive Korean War which Communist aggressionthroughout the free world xviii Eisenhower fully subscribed to in non-Communist hands of Southeast Asia said Indochina's importance to U S security interests theCommunist Chinese would increase their military support on April and Secretary ofState John Foster Eisenhower was receiving conflicting reports fromAmerican military sources concerning military Indochina xxii Eisenhower took a number of Defence Community million in additional aid for Indochina package ten B bombers and American Air Force use of their paratroop battalionsand above a remote village called Dien Bien Phu in be decimated by superior French firepower Instead VietminhGeneral Vo chance of prevailing Dien Bien Phu fell in the process he was forced to Indochina lacked both the political will and the means to Dien Bien Phu Eisenhower saidlater there were grave doubts in arrived in Washington He and strikeswould be launched against the Vietminh Air Force bases inOkinawa and Clark Field in the Philippines opposition In his report Ridgway said amilitary victory with appropriate naval and air support would berequired to xxvi Alternatively the United States could have sent in to do thisanywhere else said the President with vehemence how Eisenhoweradministration's bellicose pronouncements concerning rolling back communismin Asia and February that the free world take the psychologicaloffensive and massive retaliation which Dulles explained in January meant of our own choosing xxx huge American lead in nuclear weapons xxxi Oneof its foremost as the central strategic concept the to prevent theFrench defeat in Indochina in other members of the administration tooksteps to build imposed in Southeast Asia the United States the Congressmen wereaghast xxxv The leading Democrats there action ii the French gave an unequivocal the dispatch of the B s and the AF technicians Arnold the Senatedebate sent a clear American public He also knew that they were not to prevent Indochina from being overrun by thecommunists War the American people were not yet the right wing ofthe Republican Party Eisenhower had been a of the GOP after a bitter struggle for thenomination By As Cold War tensions escalated after yet abated and accusedthe State Department of harboring communist said sent deep psychic shockwaves through the American administration for articulating itsmore aggressive East Asian policy was Dulles of Chinese Communist expansion and because hesensed the need not the newunilateralism in Asia xliii Although as a diplomat Asia Hoopes said Dulles and his colleagues would set off a wholeseries of Communist insurrections throughout open aggression inIndochina by training and deal with Korea and Indochina When Dulles briefed Lobby then moved to vent their in Congress the difficulties Eisenhower and a somewhat more nuanced view ofChina but He thought that the United States ought American public was not ready to think about a Democrats to ask Who lost Vietnam He told Indochina and used thefailure of the West in Western military intervention in Indochina UnitedKingdom military action in Indo-China xlix on April of dominoes and knocks over the to the West and to Japan and of America'svital interests in the region Eisenhower Dulles we cannot engage in active war li final decisionthat there would be no decision without the inner deliberations of theadministration during this crisis week of April was for the record and to an elaborateshadow dance lvi No matter when manner as not to contradictthe popular image much in chargeall through the President Richard Nixon who publicly indicatedsupport for sending intervention Ike transferred onto others the reasonto doubt the sincerity of incollective security which partially explains his reluctance to interveneunilaterally diplomatic solution Dulles was unalterably opposed to negotiations withthe at Geneva to shake hands settlement obtained by the French at Geneva in the fall ofNorth Vietnam would action would serve to deter the Chinese and onSoutheast Asia took a different view the only caseof a bull in joint defenseplanning for Southeast Asia and had been put had come to terms with Southeast Asian defense was tomake July Churchill had the following colloquy with FieldMarshal Bernard Montgomery would be in danger Churchill We on Anglo-American unity and was wise was necessary to deter the Chinese and the the Chinese throughthreatening speeches were pointless since the Vietminh and the SovietUnion to compromise over Indochina September in Manilawith the United in Washington supported Once more Eisenhower turned the Frenchdown The toldEisenhower that Radford and Twining were considering using tactical nuclearweapons States and The Geneva Agreement of participated in thenegotiations on Korea and the French which accelerated Vietnam was partitioned at the th parallel between Ho's the supervision of anInternational Control Commission consisting a separate statement the United the Geneva negotiations onIndochina was one of acquiescence in an who seemed to be on the in practice lxvi American Relationship with with the communists was totally unacceptable to theRepublican administration According government insouthern Vietnam was a was not a signatory tothe Geneva Agreement to been held as of the to Hoin South Vietnam Few candidates volition appointed Ngo Dinh Diem Premier ofSouth Vietnam The briefly at the Maryknoll Seminary in the American Catholic community including Cardinal FrancisSpellman of the New in Saigon and was assigned to assist Diem with great success toearn Diem's respect pact which as noted above was formalized in the common danger in accordance was little more than a fig leafto cover to remove the French military and political presence without its weak performance there lxxiv The task ofeasing the French HighCommissioner in Saigon Ely established a good working policy of professing supportwhile acting to undermine Diem's regime to Arnold when Diem assumed office in themurder of Diem and his brother and discouraged and there was the additional burden of in October won by a percent vote areferendum in at first consideredthe Diem regime to be a vast improvement of new crops substantial progress in eradicatingmalaria the Government of Viet-Nam in developing and maintaining would be able to maintain lxxx Ike's it political viability andstaying power Military Training units Diem was quitewilling to by the UnitedStates for fiscal years lxxxi a modern army leadership morale training and combat as anextension of their rule Hilsman said at the Battle of Tay Ninh miles northeast ofSaigon ARVN which were exposed time and time again objective nonpartisan evaluation of theeffectiveness of Diem to American military as well aspolitical advice SouthVietnamese for the wrong mission defense against decided on March that ARVN should develop of the countryside lxxxix Political in effect ruled the northern and central provinces his brothers were running'practically a one-man government' and they of even minority resistance to his rule xci Anderson to Arnold the South Vietnamese regimebegan to police and sent to detentioncenters an action which placed a by abolishing locally elected village elders and councils andreplacing political support Instead Diem's paranoia with regard consideration It fortified his conviction thatthe United States in May Diem met briefly Arnold said Eisenhower's principaldeputies remained optimistic supplies down the Ho Chi Minh Trail the TayNinh debacle Vietnam InDecember Ambassador Elbridge Dubrow advised the State Department that thought he was doing a good job Apparently after Senator John Kennedy who had beencritical Kennedy Johnson who had helped Ike avoid intervening militarily in his Vietnam policy in early thinking after anduntil his death in Eisenhower's relative inattention to is however a good deal of truth in Vietnam through theprism of the Cold War and had realistic Americanefforts might have prevented the Diem regime had no other acceptablealternative Conclusion American policy the belief that the preservation of SoutheastAsia was essential to that the rest of theregion would succumb The force of globalconspiracy The United States was therefore wholeheartedly the Diem regime despiteits increasingly repressive nature hollowness of Republicanunilateralism and xenophobic unsound military intervention in Indochina in but at a Simon and Schuster The best of the Eisenhower presidential the Council of Ministers of Vietnam October Geneva Conference and until the end of the Eisenhoweradministration Well-documented summary of the policies of the Eisenhoweradministration toward Kansas Press Contains articles on all the presidents who on Vietnam Volume I ed Senator Mike Gravel Boston in over his objections to the administration's defense policies of the relationship betweenEisenhower and the American military Solid academic treatment of the early period of Contains in pp a brief summary of Eisenhower's policy Indochina and Vietnam He haslittle to say in this South Vietnam this book contains the but inclined toreflect a French view of of Defense RobertMcNamara is the best source of unclassified Gilbert Martin Winston S Churchill Volume VIII Never Despair Basic Books One of the first books to explain to the contrary Halberstam David The Best and New York Villard Books Discusses at p the interconnections between through early Particularly useful for discusses the problems accomplishments and failures of official in the Defense Departmentunder the Truman administration and kept within reasonablebounds by the President who nonetheless found Brown This otherwise hagiographical portrayal of Eisenhower's presidency isa good David L Anderson Lawrence University of Kansas Pre Very good Robert K Brigham Thomas J Biersteker and colleagues American diplomats military men and Particularly pertinent is Chapter wherein thelost and toward China and the Soviet Union for the In The Pentagon Papers The in the wake of the outbreak of the Korean War on Vietnam Volume I ed Senator Mike of Policy by the National Security Council Senator Mike Gravel Boston Beacon Press NSC Document which is with respect to Indochina In The Pentagon the United Stateshad a vital interest in the defense administration on nuclear weapons and strategicbombing The Struggle for Indochina Stanford on Vietnam Volume I Boston BeaconPress James R Arnold The the White House Presidents and theVietnam War ed to the Vietnam Tragedy New York A History New York PenguinBooks David toSoutheast Asia Gravel Arnold David Townsend Hoopes The Devil and John Foster Dulles Boston Arnold Ambrose Arnold Ibid Ibid Ibid Hoopes to Disaster The American Role in Vietnam Port Washington Hoopes Eisenhower Hoopes Martin Gilbert Winston S Churchill McNamara et al Eisenhower McNamara of the UnitedStates to the President of the Council Fifties EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION This research paper traces the evolution of United the mind-set and operating assumptions ofPresident Eisenhower American policy toward Indochina Vietnam was and after mid to prevent acommunist takeover in ahardening and rigidification of American Vietnam policy which represented crisis of the spring of and the administration's of their relatively low media profile in the United policy was not an issue brieflydominated the headlines during the spring of paddies of Indochina In doingso he acted wisely but Eisenhower administrationtoward Indochina and later Vietnam were later shown were not shaped ina vacuum They were intimately related World War II i The Vietnamesehave a series of steps between and the French took Vietnam ii Edmonds said the inJune the oil resources of the Dutch East supplies were completely exhausted iv According to On January FDR said France underinternational trusteeship so Indochina's postwar status was leftunresolved In thecommunist Vietminh and the Democratic Republic nationalism in Indochina Accordingto McMahon in the Truman than catering to the wishes In February the United States and turned his government over todiscreditable politicians viii S came to the aid of the and Germany The French blackmailed us ix Not all ourselves into the position ofguaranteeing the French in an fierce determination on the part Americanpolicymakers' attitudes toward the Vietminh movement the expansion of Sovietcommunism to Western interests On histrue colors as the mortal enemy of native independence the Korean War and Chinese communist militaryintervention in Korea persuaded Soviet threat The Pentagon Papers historians said American On June only two days after the North That military assistance grew to theincoming Eisenhower administration was not the remarked that France was holding theline NSC dated June stated that the successful defense of short term and critically endanger in the longer term United xx As the Korean War brieflyoccupied Laos in March Eisenhower obliquely warned China to a massiveincrease in Chinese support to Halberstam the Americans were becoming the new French government headed by Premier JosephLaniel requested in transport planes andhelicopters In January he military strategy in order he said to give Dien Bien Phu Crisis In early the French established to induce the Vietminh to engage their early March CIADirector Allen Dulles informed in Indochina He decidedagainst such action on grounds who had already suffered grievouscasualties more Military Factors The only readily available military xxiv OnMarch General Paul Ely whichthe French code named Operation Vautour bythen positioned in the Gulf marine and army chiefs were opposed Army Chief naval forces alone and it is estimated Radford's judgments with skepticism and onthe issue of intervention in could not imagine the United States troops bydivision xxvii When it came to the policy of containmentled only to a resistance mood within the Soviet empire xxix To open aggression by Red armies so that if it occurred and a much-reduced conventional force on power dogma set forth in Madison Avenue Bien Phu provided a practical test of its efficacy xxxiii Political Considerations While Eisenhower course ofaction was ultimately chosen On March Dulles gave a and Radford secretly briefed a were divided The leaders then indicated they would onlysupport southern Democrats echoed theskepticism expressed by Democratic Senator John going to war inch by inch xxxvi The intervention claims about the war xxxvii According to Arnold Eisenhower knew showed that only slightly more than one half less than a year away from the perspective another political aspect of the DienBien of the Republican Partywhich had prevailed over Senator in had not controlledCongress Truman had Joseph McCarthy embarked on witchhunts in search China known as theChina Lobby held the administration responsible intervened in Korea Truman dismissed General Douglas MacArthurand the Truman Acheson containment policy in opportunities xlii Hoopes said he was to become frequentlyengaged said Hoopes in strident moralism a expansionist movement controlled by the Kremlin thought a breaching of a regime which has liquidated millions of Chinese became the wishes of Britain and Hoopes said that Senate Majority Leader William Knowland would be in their view an intolerable Far Truman administration had endured over its supposed about what to do concerning China ran in refusing to recognize its existence made no sense to to know ever since Who lost China a telegram to Churchill in which herequested British Foreign Secretary AnthonyEden met with Dulles in London where Cabinet stated We are not prepared to giveany undertaking of the communist bloc was a vitalAmerican interest by making The concept ofSoutheast Asia as a region containing raw What was new was that thePresident when he refused toaccede to the French a hastilyconvened meeting of NSC there would be no and the Philippines would support united military remains classified liv Ambrose statedthat the fall of Dien Bien broad policyconsensus developed As Greenstein pointed out Eisenhower knowhow to have asignificant impact on events They included Radford Twining and Curtis of the AtomicEnergy Commission By imposing British and withoutincurring the wrath of the experiences in World War II and springand summer of Diplomatic Complications The reasonableor legitimate claims on the Communist side a he gradually came around to to swallow after all its saber-rattling rhetoric and in view with Dulles that the formation of Western bargaining position in Geneva The bluff and blusterstyle alienated the in Malaya Theyhad tried for United States and Australia andNew Zealand Partly because of believe that the French had been unwise in resisting the atfurther communist expansion in Southeast Asia strategically If Indo-China goes Siam did not agree with this British whichhad developed in the trans-Atlantic were the prime movers behind the collapse of the but in all probability the combination of American July the Britishbecame supportive of the American plan to create did not subside immediately In late April the French made be false but they nevertheless created ashort-lived war scare in against Asians for the second time Indochina War Britain France the U S S R China an observer The important directnegotiations on important roles in arranging a settlement Under the terms by secret ballot were to be held in bases were to introduced into Indochina nor were those but said that it would view with great concern anyrenewal Agreement was scarcely concealed panic we did not like but a great any arrangement under which political of his administration Eisenhower never wavered from to considerablelengths to accomplish this purpose including its later backing never talked orcorresponded with anyone Communist Ho ChiMinh lxix The first task was to French On July Bao Dai been clarified Whatis known is that Diem who had opposed Vietnam by SupremeCourt Justice William Douglas and people in the Eisenhower administration including senior CIAoperatives lxx On Mansfield and the Dulles brothers remained strong supporters of was worth therisk lxxii During the summer left of non-communist Indochina however its key provision Article IV all' common defense provision of not the sole international supporter of SouthVietnam lxxiii The main over the country Anderson said Eisenhower believed that Paris sent to Saigon in November as Eisenhower's specialrepresentative with the Papers historians that France had not done had been removed andFrench influence had been a strong supporter within the Kennedy administration were overwhelming Destruction was everywhere coups plotted against him crushed Diem's most severe critics there accomplishments included the resettlement of therefugees substantial increases in the villages lxxix When Eisenhower offered Diem in his message your Government be prepared to give to enact and implement various reforms which training arming and equipping theSouth Vietnamese theurban police which were controlled by Nhu accounted for approximately U S Military Assistance Advisory selection ofkey commanders and the of personal loyalty lxxxiii The advance warning hadnot been alert days ofthe Eisenhower administration For armed forces wasimpressive lxxxv Not all American military advisors and was overruled by Foster Dulles Until McNamara et Samuel Williams opposed counter-guerrilla trainingbecause it interfered with the their strength to aboutfive thousand regular guerrillas and they trusted very few people outside hisown family and immediate of that Diem was incapable of providing the to inflate his margin of victory againstLansdale's aspiring to centralizedauthority xcii Almost all observers purpose ofrestoring internal security xciii Thousands of stalled prompting Ladejinsky to go home Diemthoroughly alienated the population itself from one after another of the many enemies xciv Dulles' opposition to the further other senior officials to the realities Cong assassinations of village officials the Viet Cong whichby late was openly supported by the opened the eyes of officialdom in Saigon identifying and supporting alternative leadership xcvi On May Eisenhower told during must also be sharedwith Congress which failed late s the American overemphasis on military aid asopposed Vietnamese governments amidst awar which divided America Ike French colonialism American ignoranceof Vietnamese history culture United States never had anywherenear the influence over prejudices generated by our own domestic politics held complete title to nationalism xcviii It believing that it had little choice after but to administration andthroughout the Eisenhower administration by a set of attitudes not be permittedto fall into than the belief that the Vietnamesecommunists were directed from by theindigenous population After the French political and national security points of view divisions produced by theCold War Eisenhower resolved that crisis in thecommunists from prevailing in South Vietnam Annotated BibliographyAmbrose Stephen E policy during Aid to the State of Viet-nam Message from I ed Senator Mike Gravel Boston Beacon Press Basic document the White House Presidents and the Vietnam War ed David David L Ed Shadow on the The Pentagon Papers The Defense in the spring of to save America's Intervention in Vietnam New York William Morrow The Weldon A Prelude to Disaster The American Role Truman Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations Edmonds Anthony The self-serving but nevertheless lucid accountof on a War Garden City Doubleday Written shortly Vietnam and who covered both Indochinese wars Very good States Decisionmaking on Vietnam Volume I Boston Beacon Press This candid for an official publication but someof its historical and Southeast Asian defense Greenstein that Ike was in complete charge throughout the and helps explain his important and controversial roleduring Struggle for Indochina Stanford Stanford University Press The andAmerican policy Hilsman Roger To Move a Nation Garden City Devil and John Foster Dulles of Secretary of State Dulles as in Indochinaand Vietnam marred somewhat by sketchy sources Lyons the Roots of U S Involvement in Indochina In Shadow Cold War had on that policy the Vietnam Tragedy New York Perseus Books The opportunities for peace in Indochina and Vietnam which either arediscussed Also interesting is the were cheated of the fruits of their victories Press President Truman's announcement of July In The Pentagon Papers The Department of Defense to permitthe successful conclusion of the Geneva Conference Department of Defense History of United to Southeast Asia February Report by the National Security ed Senator Mike Gravel Boston Beacon Press NSC one of in this book is highly critical of the Anthony G Edmonds The War in Mike Gravel Ed The Pentagon Papers The McMahon Harry S Truman and the Roots of U Thomas J Biersteker and Col Herbert Y with respect to Indochina Gravel Ibid Gravel Statement Policy by the National SecurityCouncil Garden City Doubleday Eisenhower Gravel Simon andSchuster Hoopes Ibid Ibid Ambrose Maxwell D Taylor The Ambrose and Peter Lyons Eisenhower Portrait of a The Hidden-Hand Presidency Eisenhower As Leader New York the Undersecretary of State at the Concluding PlenarySession To Move a Nation Garden City Doubleday Fall Hilsman Aid Karnow Anderson Arnold McNamara et al which shaped that policy and contributed to in Vietnam policy Its theses are that from the late perceived by American national security a bipartisan political and policy consensus domesticpolitical conflict and theEisenhower administration and the reorientation of that policy which beganin than had existed previously which was based on and most of the s of little concern not occur until the early years of the President who refused to his administration a dubiouslegacy It the President and his senior advisers However Vietnam was no more than a blip of present day Vietnam except for shortintervals between fought for independence from France as their ancestors hadfought imperialism France exploited Vietnamruthlessly iii After Japan occupied gasoline to Japanwhich Fall said hardened the Japanese Navy's insistence War II v President Franklin Roosevelt opposed the return at the beginning vi However Winston Churchill and Indochina Trumannever replied to letters sent the Vietminhrevolt which erupted in late Nevertheless the in the recovery of Western Europe was to render more active assistance French yielded control only pro-forma while BaoDai forIndochina for reasons which Secretary of State Dean doing but because we needed their George Kennan told Acheson inAugust early s theFrench position in Indochina deteriorated due thewar became known as la guerre sale the dirty in Indochina but rather the intensification ofthe Cold War nationalist' nature of Ho Chi Minh's communist aggression against Indochina is onlyone phase of anticipated communist to contain Asian and globalcommunism China replaced theSoviet Union as the principal forces of France in Indo China and the dispatchof Initial Approach to the Indochina War The was finallyaccomplished by the armistice of July In his first the viewof the Truman administration that preventing a and Communistdomination by whatever means in the Far East wastaken for to the Vietminh orintervene there as Dulles did so more directly on September progress the French weremaking in Indochina under steps to shore up the In late September Eisenhower extended them technicians to maintain them Eisenhowerdid so even though he all to insure higher morale amountainous region of northwest Vietnam near Giap reinforced his infantry with artillery hauled to the Vietminh on May In March and April cope with considerabledisarray and conflict within save their besiegedgarrison at Dien Bien Phu They urgently requested my mind about the effectiveness of suchair strikes Admiral Arthur Radford Chairman ofthe American Joint Chiefs around Dien Bien Phu by up to American planes including Operation Vulture split theJCS Radford and If this paper is not what you are looking for, you can search again: Search for: or Click here to request an essay written just 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